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FOREWORD:
THE QUESTION OF PROCESS
J. Harvie Wilkinson III*

Many in the legal profession have abandoned the great questions
of legal process. This is too bad. How a decision is reached can be as
important as what the decision is. In an increasingly diverse country
with many competing visions of the good, it is critical for law to aspire
to agreement on process - a task both more achievable than agree
ment on substance and more suited to our profession than waving the
banners of ideological truth.
By process, I mean the institutional routes by which we in America
reach our most crucial decisions. In other words, process is our collec
tive answer to the time-honored question, "Who decides?" Its vintage
notwithstanding, many now doubt the salience of this query. We grow
more passionate and argumentative over the achievement of substan
tive ends. And it is to those ends that process has become subservient.
Process today lacks a disinterested life of its own. The important
thing, it seems, is to advance on all fronts and prevail at all costs. The
measure of process has become whether it can take us where we want
to go - not whether it is the best route regardless of the destination.
A vision of society where substantive outcomes alone are para
mount thus threatens to engulf us. Some would say that it already has.
Only by recommitting ourselves to process can we ensure the legiti
macy of the outcomes themselves.
I.
The neglect of process has produced confusion on a broad scale.
We no longer know who is to perform what role. Worse still, we are
no longer persuaded that it matters. The blurring of roles between
legislative and judicial, between federal and state, and between public
and private is endemic. Naturally, there will always be functional
overlap and institutional cooperation. But we ask too infrequently the
question of which forum is best suited for the resolution of which dis
putes. We certainly do not pose that question a priori, before out
comes are known and minds become set.
Every problem in America poses the initial question of which deci
sionmaker(s) should address it. We have an abundance of potential
decisionmaking institutions in our country: Congress, the federal
*
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courts, the administrative process, the states, the localities, and the
private sector. Each of the decisionmakers carries a different balance
sheet. The federal judiciary is independent, but also elitist and unac
countable. The Congress is adept at democratic compromise, but be
holden to special interests. The bureaucracy is expert, but unfathom
able.
The problem solving of the states may be creative, but
piecemeal. Localities may be participatory democracies, but majori
tarian tyrannies. A market may be the agent of general well-being,
but also of individual distress.
It is no easy task to agree on the characteristics of decisionmaking
institutions, much less which institutions should be trusted with soci
ety's most difficult problems. But by refusing to ask the institutional
questions a priori, we deny ourselves a sense of detachment. It is not
enough to believe, for example, that crime or discrimination is our
foremost social problem and then latch on to whatever anti-crime or
anti-discrimination proposal lies most conveniently at hand. Crime
and discrimination are both subject to an infinite variety of solutions
that range from the most national to the most local and from the most
public to the most private. If our substantive preferences and process
predilections invariably coincide, then we deny the workings of consti
tutional democracy our most basic respect.
It may seem odd for a judge to lament the demise of process. We
are, as the saying goes, part of the problem. Although many decry ju
dicial activism, it is frequently practiced by both "liberal" and "con
servative" judges.
When the Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education, it raised hopes that it could serve as a beacon of enlight
ened decisionmaking, especially on difficult issues such as race. Con
fidence in the judicial branch produced a boom in public interest liti
gation - suits brought expressly for the purposes of advancing overtly
social goals. First developed as a tool by more liberal groups such as
the NAACP and the ACLU, the public interest lawsuit is now also
used to great effect by more conservative groups. Frustrated with the
gridlock of Congress, savvy activists will often skip the political proc
ess altogether and bring their grievances directly to the third branch.
When lawsuits become the vehicle of preference for important
changes of policy, power shifts from the people to the judges.
For this development, the judiciary shares much of the blame.
And the advocacy class has taken its signal from the courts. For ex
ample, the question of our commitment to process often comes home
to me when considering amicus briefs. Amicus briefs can be quite
helpful, and I confess to reading them. Organizations with a demon
strated interest or expertise in a given subject ought as a matter of fair
procedure to be allowed their say.1 But underneath many an amicus

1. See FED. R. APP. P. 29.
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brief is an unstated assumption - we have a problem and the court
might as well find an answer. But why should the court be the one to
decide? Many amicus brief writers focus on the urgency of the prob
lem and explain in alarmist tones the consequences of a "wrong" deci
sion. Intriguing social insights and dazzling empirical demonstrations
do little to displace the sense that judges are being addressed as legis
lators and lobbied for a particular result.
The growth of the amicus industry reveals our new judicial age. In
1965, approximately one-third of all Supreme Court cases decided by
opinion involved amicus briefs.2 Between 1986 and 1991, eighty-four
percent of cases had at least one amicus brief, and the average case
had over four.3 Each new controversial case breaks the previous rec
ord for number of amicus briefs filed. In the 1978 case, Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, there were fifty-seven amicus briefs.4
When a major challenge to Roe v. Wade arose in the 1989 case,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court received seventy
eight amicus briefs.5 In Webster, 420 organizations participated as fil
ers or co-signatories.6 Some of the amici reiterate more polemically
the arguments already made by one of the parties. These briefs are
not by "friends of the court," but rather by friends of a cause.
Public interest groups don't just file briefs in cases before the
Court - they also seek to influence which cases are heard by the
Supreme Court. Amicus briefs pour in even during the certiorari pro
cess, when the Court is deciding which cases to review. Last term the
Court received more than 7000 petitions for certiorari, but heard
fewer than 100 cases. The amicus briefs filed on certiorari thus act as
"cues," indicating to justices the importance of a dispute. Some politi
cal scientists estimate that the addition of just one amicus brief in
creases the likelihood of Supreme Court review by forty to fifty per
cent.7
Some amici do, of course, speak in thoughtful process terms, but
others have a thinly veiled political tone. Notwithstanding their use
fulness in individual cases, the overall piling up of amicus briefs is part
of the "vigorous, extensive, and continuing effort[] on the part of in
terest groups to lobby the courts."8 But given the complexity of soci2 See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33

3. See Lee Epstein, Interest
POL. 639, 645 {1993).
4.

See id.

5.

See id.

6.

See id.

CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 603 {1984).

Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era,

9 J.L. &

at 646.
at 653.

7. See id. at 663.
8. Jane S. Schacter,

The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond,

51 STAN. L. REV. l, 47 {1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ety and the "orgy of statute-making"9 that inevitably accompanies it, I
suspect the era of the anticus is here to stay. In fact, the matter feeds
upon itself. As courts involve themselves in more and more areas,
more beams of light are required to illuminate the way. Justice Hugo
Black encouraged amicus briefs because they promoted democratic
results from a Court that issued broad decisions affecting more than
just the litigants before it.1° Faye Wattleton, President of Planned
Parenthood, emphasizes: "The court is not sequestered on anotht:r
planet. It does hear the voices of the American people."11 Yes, but
isn't that what legislatures do? As we on the bench listen to the
drumbeat of political argument, we shall over time become more po
litical ourselves. There is something disquieting about this morphing
of institutional roles - with courts as the second act of a protracted
legislative debate.
This confusion of roles is not just the judiciary's problem. The
change in the judicial culture has an academic analogue. In fact, the
interdisciplinary focus of many amicus briefs often parallels the inter
disciplinary curriculum of a first-rate law school. The law school
might be likened to a culture whose inhabitants find themselves bom
barded by exposure to a larger world. The social and physical sciences
lay claim to breadth, contemporaneity, sophistication, and modern
know-how. And the challenge for legal education is to absorb without
being absorbed, to steer between outright rejection and uncritical ac
ceptance. The merger of disciplines and methodologies on the bench
and in the classroom is thus in one sense welcome. In another sense,
however, it has made it far more difficult for lawyers to pose lawyerly
questions. With all these new tools and insights at hand, we need no
longer be preoccupied with points of process. As individuals we are
liberated. As a discipline, alas, we are no longer distinct.
II.
If our neglect of process were nothing more than an occasion for
nostalgia, it would be of little moment. But this neglect carries serious
contemporary consequences. There is a price to be paid for confusing
legal roles. Think for a moment of how it feels to be bested by some
one who does not follow the rules. Then multiply your sense of per
sonal disillusionment by the millions. There is nothing so corrosive to

9.

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).

10. See Justice Hugo Black, Memorandum for the Conference from Hugo L. Black
(April 9, 1954), in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, cited in Michael Rustad &
Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus
Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 97 n.26 (1993).
11. LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE:
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 273 (1992).
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public confidence in public institutions as the idea that a decision,
whether right or wrong, represented at heart an arrogation of author
ity. Such usurpation is unbecoming in constitutional democracies that
should rest on the idea that the crude displacement of proper deci
sionmaking channels is little better than a putsch.
Each branch of government provides examples of the illegitimacy
that flows from a questionable assumption of authority. For instance,
administrative agencies regularly make broad policy decisions with
uncertain connections to their statutory mandate. The question of the
harm caused by private sector activity is not the same as the ability of
some public agency to regulate it. Courts have also placed their own
gloss on general statutory language. The Sherman Act12 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 have seen much judicial flesh added to their bare bones common law interpretations that stretch far beyond enacted text. One
may applaud the imposition of liability on school districts for demon
strating deliberate indifference to one student's sexual harassment of
another.13 One may heartily approve efforts to override Oregon's
physician-assisted suicide statute.14 But is the Supreme Court in the
former case and Congress in the latter the proper instrument of deci
sion?
It will be said that the public does not even follow a debate over
process. Perhaps faith in public institutions is measured only by our
substantive policy preferences concerning sexual harassment and as
sisted suicide. Then again, the prevalence of public cynicism toward
public life may reflect the fact that institutional roles are so muddled
and institutional accountability so diffuse that public participation no
longer makes a difference. The demise of process leads a citizenry to
ask at the end of the day, "Why bother?" Every citizen in a democ
racy has a role in determining substantive results. But in a democracy
it is the special role of the legal profession to maintain the boundaries
of institutional authority. When we fail to perform this task, we jeop
ardize participation in democracy. And fostering alienation from de
mocracy is not what law should be about.
Process dissolution has taken a heavy toll not only on society, but
also on the law itself. The concern with orderly process is central to
the identity of law, and helps to differentiate legal debate from politi
cal dialogue. For the political dialogue is by nature programmatic and
concerned with results. The legal conversation is, or at least should
be, more attuned to means, that is to say process. The curiosity of the
past quarter-century is how often and how far the legal dialogue has
strayed off course. Whether the subject is abortion, school prayer,

12. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1994).
13. See Davis v. Monroe CountyBd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
14. See H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999).
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sexual harassment, gay rights or single-sex schooling, lawyers of all
persuasions have indulged endlessly the rightness or wrongness of
matters to the exclusion of process questions.
The upshot of all this has been a highly politicized legal profession
and one that is increasingly less distinct from politics itself. The giant
Supreme Court confirmation battles and judicial debates move for
ward in an atmosphere of competing certitudes, as though the
wrenching social, political, and moral dilemmas of our time m11::;t
somehow yield to one right answer. The irony of this is lost on no one.
The foremost goal of law has been the resolution, not the fomentation,
of social discord. As law loses sight of process and focuses on out
come, it will raise, not lower, the decibel of social conflict.
III.
The genesis of our predicament lies in the widespread abandon
ment of the belief that institutions can ever act in a manner indifferent
to substantive outcomes. The legal realist critique has led many to
forsake the idea of formal neutrality. We have exchanged our belief in
process for an unremitting skepticism that neutral principles can ever
be discerned, much less embodied in our decisionmaking institutions.
We have deconstructed the world, and all is mere politics. An institu
tion is no more than the individuals who comprise it, and their deci
sions reflect nothing grander than themselves. One's preference for
judicial review thus rests solely on who the judges are. One's choice
for local democracy depends only on whose side is "in." Whichever
game one is playing, it is always rigged. Persons, and not processes,
are the only coin in this realm.
Our skepticism about the formal neutrality of institutional ar
rangements is in no small measure justified. We who came of age with
George Wallace, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon in office awoke
to the fact that our supposedly democratic processes were more dis
honest and discriminatory than many had been willing to admit.
There are also conceptual difficulties with the idea of pure formal neu
trality. Legal realism, and contemporary constitutional theory in par
ticular, have forcefully exposed its flaws. For example, Professors
Michael Seidman and Mark Tushnet have argued that our choice of
legal rules and processes cannot ultimately be divorced from our po
litical preferences.15 While their ultimate skepticism about the possi
bility of neutral principles reflects undue despair, the challenge they
pose to proponents of neutrality is undeniable. Thus, it is not that the
genie of legal realism should be stuffed back in the bottle. It is rather
that our lack of faith in legal institutions has proceeded too far.
15. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 27-28 (1996).
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None of us should hail the abandonment of belief in formal neu
trality. While the legal realist critique may often be descriptively ac
curate, it fails to supply adequate fuel for the aspirations of the legal
profession. While the decision of an individual judge at a given time
may reflect what he or she had for breakfast, this does not mean that
we cannot fare better after the next meal. Indeed, the consequences
of the abandonment of process have become spiritually deadening.
We cannot allow the odes to liberty and justice etched into the facades
of law schools and courthouses to be replaced with the admonition,
"Abandon all hope, ye who enter here."
Legal academia itself provides a source for professional aspiration
just as it poses the challenge. Concern with process is a distinguished
tradition in the law. "Reasoned elaborationists," such as Henry Hart
and Herbert Wechsler, demonstrated how adherence to neutral prin
ciples and the articulation of reasons for decisions could lead to genu
inely principled decisionmaking that respected institutional bounda
ries.16
Scholars like John Hart Ely have ably advanced process
theories showing how law can be distinct from politics even in a world
imbued with skepticism about neutrality.17 One need not subscribe to
all the tenets of any of these theories to appreciate their aspirational
force. They reaffirm that process calls upon us to realize the best of
law's possibilities.
Process questions offer hope. They are mediative inquiries, one
step removed from the merits, and they offer the profession the op
portunity to discuss institutional arrangements for the resolution of
heated social questions - arrangements that incidentally hold out the
prospect of ultimate compromise. Agreement as to outcomes lies be
yond the power of even a relatively homogeneous society to achieve.
And such agreement will surely prove elusive to the racially and cul
turally diverse America of the twenty-first century. Agreement on
process, while difficult, does not present the same impossible obstacles
as agreement on substance. This is so for many reasons - among
them that we can establish the rules of the game at the outset, that we
can demonstrate our bona fides by abiding outcomes that displease us,
and that the process itself carries the prospect of ultimate change to
our liking.
Attention to process is not therefore a return to the old days. It of
fers promise for the future. A multicultural nation may find in process
a means of muting differences. A society beset by bewildering change
may find in process stable ways of making that change come about. A
culture torn over questions of personal autonomy may discover in

16. See generally G.E. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973) (providing an insightful intellectual
history of this and other currents of legal thought).
17.

See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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process a means of decentralizing and diversifying outcomes. What
agreement future Americans achieve may center on process, in part
because cultural consensus may not withstand the waves of demo
graphic and technological change. Our constitution encourages this
continuing commitment to process - it is one way our changing coun
try remains the same.
A return to questions of process is timely in another sense. The
question of discrimination in all its dimensions has dominated legal
discourse for much of the past half-century. And the elimination of
discrimination has seemed so fastened to a single set of institutional
arrangements - the vigorous assertion of federal authority in all its
forms - that even to pose questions of process was to engage in a sub
terfuge. One can understand this perception more easily in the 1950s
and 1960s than in the year 2000, when questions of civil rights law are
more varied, more complicated, and more amenable to the airing of
responsible views on respective sides. With this development, a great
obstacle to the discussion of process has been removed, and law may
return to consider the structure of governance without the imputation
of racial ill will.
Process values should prove neither liberal nor conservative. The
fact that courts act "liberally" to enforce constitutional rights says
nothing about whether or not they act justifiably. The fact that
Congress acts "conservatively" to preempt state law or override "lib
eral" state social experimentation says nothing about whether the mat
ter is intrinsically one of federal or state competence. Similarly, proc
ess values invariably counsel neither activism nor restraint. In
enforcing the constitution's grand structural constraints, the Court
may be "activist" in the course of "restraining" a coordinate branch.
The process debate is meaningful only to the extent that it manages to
transcend such shop-worn labels. Properly applied, process values
may come to represent neutral principles in much the same sense that
the First Amendment protects ideas we love and those we hate.
IV.
I would ask that the reader approach the following books and re
views with the view that no question of substance may be answered
without some procedural accompaniment. This is an honorable union
in the law, and it ill serves us to engage in advocacy without reflecting
on whether courts or legislatures or states or localities or markets or
private organizations or some felicitous combination of the same
should bring about this or that change for the new century.
The books reviewed in this issue present plenty of material for
provocative debate, which itself is a testament to the energy of the
modem academic enterprise. Notwithstanding their refreshing variety
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of approach and subject matter, there is much to ask in process terms
about this latest scholarship.
Some of the books take up discrete areas of contemporary interest
and controversy. For example, Professor Milton Regan addresses the
institution of marriage;18 Professor Gerald Frug the state of the mod
ern American city;19 Professor Lawrence Lessig the regulation of cy
berspace;20 ·Professor Daniel Farber environmental law and regula
tion;21 Professor William Eskridge the history and contemporary status
of gay rights;22 Professor David Cole race and the criminal justice sys
tem;23 and Professor John Lott the consequences of gun control meas
ures.24 These books address well defined matters of current impor
tance that require the rigorous application of process analysis. Do the
authors propose at least partial solutions to the problems they de
scribe? And, critically, do the authors give thought to the institutional
processes most appropriate for putting their suggested reforms into
practice?
Professors Terri Peretti and Mark Tushnet are thinking in process
terms all right, but differently. Professor Peretti unabashedly wel
comes a political Court.25 In a populist assault on judicial review, Pro
fessor Tushnet rightly decries the elitist tendencies of federal courts,
but wrongly undervalues their independence.26 The reader may want
to ask whether Tushnet's process argument can be fruitfully pressed at
this level of generality, or whether the case for or against judicial re
view must be more closely matched to the problem presented by the
particular case or controversy.
Other authors are plainly thinking outside the box. Professors
Anne Alstott and Bruce Ackerman propose that all U.S. citizens with
high school diplomas receive $80,000 on their 21st birthdays, no strings
attached.27 (The originality of this thesis should not obscure the fact

18. See MILTON
MARRIAGE (1999).

c.

REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF

19. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:
BUILDING WALLS (1999).
20.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG,

BUILDING COMMUNTI1ES WITHOUT

CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).

21. See DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM:
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999).

MAKING

SENSIBLE

22. See WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET (1999).
23. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).
24. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND
GUN-CONTROL LAWS (1998).
25.

See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT

(1999).

26. MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
27.

See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY

(1999).
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that redistribution outside of education often fares better from young
to old, not vice versa.) Professor Paul Kahn regards law not as a sys
tem of processes but as a phenomenon of culture, and he proceeds to
examine the concepts of time, space, citizen, judge, and sovereignty
that comprise it.28
Are empirical inquiries and process theories somehow inconsis
tent? Is a profession devoted to the importance of process too agnos
tic and relativistic in its own right, as devoid of values as our valueless
age? These are questions suggested, respectively, by Judge Richard
Posner's29 and Professor Stephen Carter's30 books - fair reminders
that process is neither a panacea nor the only game in town. In a
broad sense, Professor Carter shares with Professors Robert Frank,31
Alstott, and Ackerman the view that many American citizens lack a
sense of connection to the larger social fabric, an ill that Alstott and
Ackerman would cure with money, which Frank believes causes much
of the problem to begin with.
I regret the inability to touch upon all the books reviewed in this
volume. I would certainly not devalue any study of English law in the
Fourteenth Century, no matter how distant it might appear from the
hot-button issues of contemporary controversy.32 The books as a
whole, however, are concerned with present-day America. And the
authors as a whole present, even in this best of economic times, a pic
ture of an ailing nation. The litany of shortcomings is certainly eclec
tic. We have made a mess of our cities.33 We tolerate an unfair system
of criminal justice.34 We have shown a lack of respect for religious be
lief.35 We have failed to make young Americans stakeholders in our
larger society.36 We indulge in needless luxuries.37 We have failed to
eradicate discrimination against gays, women, and racial and ethnic

28. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (1999).
29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999).
30. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF Tiffi GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON
LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998).
31. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN
ERA OF EXCESS (1999).
32. See ANTHONY MUSSON & W.M. ORMROD, THE EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH JUSTICE:
LAW, PoLmCS, AND SOCIETYINTIIEFOURTEENTH CENTURY (1999).
33. See FRUG, supra note 19.
34. See COLE, supra note 23.
35. See CARTER, supra note 30.
36. See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTI, supra note 27.
37. See FRANK, supra note 31.
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minorities.38 We have overregulated guns.39 We have betrayed liberty
on campus.40 We have constructed a court system and constitutional
ethos that is out of touch and overly moralistic.41
One response to this is: "Come on. This is a wonderful country.
Give America a break." But one mark of our magnificence is a will
ingness to examine our shortcomings, and boosterism is no more the
role of law schools than it is of, say, the press. If the law faculties are
not critical, then who will be? But just as one expects the academy to
level honest criticism at the legal and social order, so also is it fair to
ask in return whether scholarship is actually serving its larger purpose,
which is to aid and assist that which is taken to task. The widening es
trangement between the academic and practicing parts of our profes
sion has surely escaped the attention of no one, and it is just as clear
that many in academia regard distance from the larger profession as a
good and noble thing. In this view, the less "useful" a study is, the
more claim it can lay to its own integrity. Professional peers are too
often seen exclusively as other academics - the presence of consult
ing notwithstanding, when was the last time a professor sent a practi
tioner a proposed paper to read? Shared fora are becoming infre
quent - faculty talks to faculty; judges talk to judges; practitioners
talk to other practitioners, and fragmentation proceeds apace.
It is here that process questions might bridge the gap. Because the
law of process involves nothing less than institutional routes for im
plementing ideas in a democracy, the process debate may bring aca
demic proposals to the attention of a broader world. Decisionmakers
take an active interest in the question of who is to decide. And a focus
on process may imbue legal scholarship with even greater practical
value, in the sense that proposals may be matched to institutional
competencies for achieving them.
I do not claim that a renewed attention to process will solve all
problems, but it will help a lot. America has survived a twentieth cen
tury where ideology negated the rule of law in many parts of the
world. The tug of ethnic hatreds at the outset of the twenty-first cen
tury reminds us that ideological forces, though perhaps beaten back,
are merely at bay. Looking to process as a source of legitimacy for our
decisions and unity for our nation will help arrest the subjugation of

38. See ROBERT s. CHANG, DISORIENTED: AsIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE
NATION-STATE (1999); EsKRIDGE, supra note 22; CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M.
MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN
(2000).
39. See LOTT, supra note 24.
40. See ALAN c. KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE
BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA'S CAMPUSES (1998).
41. See POSNER, supra note 29.
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law to ideology. For those committed to a nation ruled by law, there
can be no greater benefit.

